Study on the Auction Strategy of Highway Franchising

摘要：

This paper presents a simple framework evaluating different mechanisms for auctioning highway franchising contracts.The difference of the private information about the future demand of highway makes firms different bids.When the franchise term is fixed,the building cost and the discount rate increase the bids,but the franchise term decreases the bids.More demanding information make firm bid lower.The practice tolls the highway user pays in first-price auction will be lower than that in second-price auction.Similarly,we get the equilibrium term bidding when the toll is fixed.Both of the building cost and the discount rate increase the bids,but the toll decreases the bids.The winner gets lower term in the first-price auction.Thus,the regulator or auctioneer prefers to auction highway franchise in first-price auction.

关键词： Auction Highway franchise Term Toll

作者: Wang Yan Wang Ying

作者单位: School of Economics,South-Central University for Nationality,P.R.China,430074 Economics and Management School of Wuhan University,P.R.China,430072

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第三届产品创新管理国际会议(The 3rd International Conference on Product Innovation Management)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2008-10-26（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）