Analysis on Enterprises R&D Strategy under Stackelberg Competition

摘要：

Based on the AJ model,this paper establishes a three-stage strategic game model under Stackelberg competition in the condition that the Stackelberg leader introduces R&D.The model concerns about the cost-reducing R&D and takes spillover effect into account.After R&D is introduced,the situation of the leader and consumer both improves and the situation of the price-taker improves only when the spillover effect is great.As the spillover increases,the leaders profit and the consumers surplus decrease.In this model,the economy of equilibrium cost is lower than the economy of the social optimum cost.

关键词： Stackelberg competition Spillover R&D

作者: Zhang Peng Zhang Meiqing

作者单位: School of International Trade and Economics,University of International Business and Economics,Beiji The Center for Infrastructure Research(CIR),Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing,P.R.China,100044

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 第三届产品创新管理国际会议(The 3rd International Conference on Product Innovation Management)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2008-10-26（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）