The Effect of Trading of Emission Permit on Product Market under Conditions of Duopoly
Tradable emission permits are increasingly pursed as a regulatory instrument, to control for environmental quality. However,in the presence of market power, regulation through an allocation of tradable rights genially yields inefficient outcomes.This papcr dcmonstrates that when the product market is duopoly,price-taking behavior in pewits market ensures transfer of licenses to the less efficient abatement firms,which then become more aggressive in the product market and acquire addthonal permits. Besides, it may result in higher production of firms whose cost is higher, and lower productions of firms whose cost is lower.
duopoly tradable emission permits produce market Cournot equilibrium
Wenhui Zhao Quansheng Shi
School of Management & Humanity,Shanghai University of Electric Power,P.R. China,200090
国际会议
2008 International Conference on System Management(2008年系统管理学术研讨会)(2008 CSM)
上海
英文
519-525
2008-05-30（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）