Research on Signalling Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Tow-Part Tariff
Recently,the product remanufacturing has been a hot topic in the field of operational management,and more manufacturers are beginning to recover the value in their end-of-life(EOL)products by remanufacturing. This paper focuses on the closed-loop supply chain where the retailer takes charge of retail,and the 3rd-part logistics(3PL)collection.There are two possible types of the manufacturer as an assumption,i.e.her remanufactured product quality is good or poor,and of course the manufacturer knows her type,whereas the retailer and the 3PL only have a prior probability over the two possible quality types.This paper deploys the contracts with which the good quality manufacturer can signal her type to the retailer and the 3PL to improve her profit under incomplete information.As a result,the signalling mechanism can help the good quality manufacturer distinguish her from the poor.
closed-loop supply chain game theory incomplete information principal-agent signalling mechanism
Jingyan Ge Peiqing Huang Juan Li
School of Management & Humanity,Shanghai Univ. of Electric Power,Shanghai200090,China Antai School of Management,Shanghai Jiaotong Univ.,Shanghai200030,China
国际会议
2008 International Conference on System Management(2008年系统管理学术研讨会)(2008 CSM)
上海
英文
314-322
2008-05-30（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）