The Economic Analysis of Education Signal in Recruitments

摘要：

The importance of talents is known to all,but how to recruit talents is a difficult problem.Spence founded the labor market signaling model in the 1970s.,which emphatically analyzed the influence of the educational signal to the asymmetric information and equilibrium of the labor market.Through the economic analysis,this article show the method how the employer overcome the problem of asymmetric information and attract the talents among the competitors.

关键词： education signal separating equilibrium pooling equilibrium job-market signalling

作者: Xiuli Yao Huaying Shu

作者单位: Economics and Management School,Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Beijing 100876,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2008 International Conference on System Management(2008年系统管理学术研讨会)(2008 CSM)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 209-212

在线出版日期: 2008-05-30（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）