Game Analysis of Supply Chain Collaboration
Supply chain collaboration is different from traditional horizontal integration and parties in supply chain collaboration have independent legal or at least managerial control. As all the parties in supply chain are independent rationalists who would rather pursue their own maximum benefits than the profits of the whole supply chain, supply chain collaboration has more uncertainty and is influenced by more factors. In this paper, we try to use strategy game to analyze collaborative behaviors of parties in supply chain. From economic angle, Nash equilibrium of the game is not the most optimum and there isnt enough impetus to realize supply chain collaboration. Repeated game facilitates the realization of supply chain collaboration. We also try to analyze the game from non-economic angle as a complementary content of repeated game and this is the originality of this paper. In the game from non-economic angle, every party would firstly select collaboration no matter what the other would select in order to earn more non-economic payoff increment, which is sure to lead to Nash equilibrium of collaboration and collaboration.This equilibrium is the most optimum and results in the maximum social benefits increment directly.
supply chain collaboration game economic angle non-economic angle
Zha Xianjin Yan Mi
Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing,100044,China School of Information Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan,P.R.China,430072
国际会议
2006 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering(2006管理科学与工程国际学术研讨会)
武汉
英文
1161-1165
2006-11-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）