The Optimal Contract for Complemented Knowledge Sharing between Partners in Knowledge Alliance in the Competitive Market
This paper uses the game theory to analyze a practical problem of encouraging complemented knowledge sharing between knowledge owners in the competitive market,and draw the following conclusion through analyzing the characteristics of the optimal contract.In the competitive market,the benefit of knowledge partners varies because the proportion of contribution of the total outcome from partners devotion to technology and knowledge varies.In equilibrium the yield of one partner equals to the contribution rate of the individual knowledge to total outcome,namely the price of the technology,which is often realized as the payment of the technology in the profit distribution.The yield of the other part equals to its contribution rate of field knowledge and its market ability.The optimal knowledge sharing between alliance partners and maximal income could be achieved based on the optimal yield.Lower yield which under the contribution rate will lead to the risk of insufficient knowledge sharing.
Knowledge alliance Knowledge sharing Competitive market Motivation system
Ma Yanan Diao Lilin
College of Economics and Management,South China Agricultural University,China
国际会议
杭州
英文
104-107
2008-04-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）