Stackelberg Game in a Two-echelon Supply Chain under Buy-back Coordination Contract
In this study,we analyze the full-return coordination mechanism in a two-echelon supply chain,with either supplier or retailer in dominant position.Stackelberg game models are proposed,with symmetric information and price dependent demand considered.The Nash equilibrium solution can be derived.By simulation with Maple software,the model shows the relationship among the decision variables and how the decision variables influence the expected profit of supply chain members in different types of supply chain.Decision scenarios in three different types of supply chain,such as no-return,supplierdominant full return,and retailer-dominant full return policies,are analyzed and compared.Finally,the model is applied to a numerical example.The result from the model analysis can provide decision support during buy-back coordination contracting process.
Supply Chain Coordination Full buy-back policy Stackelberg game Nash equilibrium solution
Huilin Chen Kejing Zhang
Glorious Sun School of Business and ManagementDongHua UniversityShanghai,China Glorious Sun School of Business and Management DongHua University Shanghai,China
国际会议
北京
英文
2008-10-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）