Contract design for increasing supplier,s capacity,in a two-stage supply chain, with stochastic demand
Recent applications of game theoretic analysis,to supply chain efficiency have focused on contract between a buyer (retailer or manufacturer) and a seller (supplier),in successive stages of a supply chain.In this paper,a JIT environment in which,the manufacturers final demand is stochastic is assumed.Supplier makes decision about his raw material capacity and pre-processed materials,before receiving manufacturers order,and the manufacturer places his order to the supplier,after final demand is realized.Supplier has an incentive to keep his capacities relatively low,to avoid creating unneeded capacity and material.The manufacturer,on the other hand,prefers the suppliers capacity to be high,to ensure that the final demand is satisfied.In this paper,it is shown how manufacturer can use penalty and award contracts,to incentive supplier for increasing respectively,raw material capacity and pre-processed material.Results indicate using these contracts; can lead to optimal performance in the supposed supply chain.
supply chain coordination contract design stackelberg equilibrium
Iman Nosoohi Ali Shahandeh Nookabadi
Department of Industrial & Systems engineering,Isfahan University of Technology (IUT),Iran 84156
国际会议
北京
英文
2008-10-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）