Signaling Game Analysis of Return Service in Electronic Commerce
Electronic commerce breaks through the limiting factors in time and space,and improves the efficiency of the market evidently.On the other hand,electronic commerce is virtual,anonymous and open,these characteristics lead information asymmetry to be serious more and more.Nowadays,the problem of information asymmetry in return goods service becomes obvious gradually.Consumers cant return the goods that they are not satisfied,even consumers buy the goods from sellers who claim that they provide return service.This problem seriously reduces consumers confidence in electronic commerce,also restricts further development of electronic commerce.This paper,from the view of signaling games,is attempted to discuss the different Bayesian Equilibrium between sellers and consumers game in different cases of return service.Finally the paper find out the factors influenced the equilibrium,and brings reasonable suggestions to reduce information asymmetry in return service.
signaling game return service electronic commerce
Jun Tan Zhongchun Mi
School of Management University of Science and Technology of ChinaHefei,P.R.China,230051 School of Management University of Science and Technology of China Hefei,P.R.China,230051
国际会议
北京
英文
2008-10-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）