Linear Penalty Contract for Coordinating Capacity Procurement and Sales Promotion

摘要：

A typical supply chain setting is analyzed,where the suppliers capacity building and the retailers sales promotion needs to be launched simultaneously before demand is realized.Firstly it is demonstrated that the contract of a wholesale price with a lump sum transfer can coordinate the supply chain only when it is enforced under forced compliance.However forced compliance is not a realistic assumption.For coordinating the supply chain,a linear penalty contract is proposed,in which the suppliers penalty is linear with the capacity deficiency.And with the linear penalty contract the supply chains optimal solution is the unique Nash equilibrium.

关键词： supply chain contract sales promotion capacity procurement

作者: Guangsong Lu Xingguo Li Dongxiao Gu

作者单位: Department of Management EngineeringAnhui Institute of Architecture & IndustryHefei,China School of Management Hefei University of TechnologyHefei,China School of Management Hefei University of Technology Hefei,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2008 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics(IEEE/SOLI’2008)(IEEE服务运作、物流与信息年会)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2008-10-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）