Channel Pricing Strategy under Manufacturer Collusion Mode
Manufacturer collusion is a method for improving profit,it will influence the conduct of channel pricing.To the conventional channel structure made of many manufacturers and many retailers,the paper discusses the influence of manufacturer collusion on channel pricing decision under three kinds of channel price leadership.The research results are as follows.Under manufacturer Stackelberg leadership,manufacturer collusion has no impact on channel pricing decision.Under vertical Nash or retailer Stackelberg leadership,manufacturer collusion can improve the manufacturers profit level and reduce the retailers profit level,but whether the wholesale price and retailing pricing and retailer margin will increase lies on the level of manufacturing costs.Comparing to other channel price leaderships,the manufacturers profit and retailers profit under manufacturer Stackelberg leadership are the highest under manufacturer collusion,but the manufacturers profit level under retailer Stackelberg leadership.Under manufacturer collusion,channel pricing decision under vertical Nash or retailer Stackelberg leadership is not influence by product differentiation,but the manufacturer will get more profit if the product differentiation is bigger under manufacturer Stackelberg leadership.Under whichever channel power structure,the retailer will get more profit if the retailer differentiation is bigger.
manufacturer collusion channel price leadership channel pricing decision product differentiation retailer differentiation
Xiaojun Fan Hong-min Chen
School of Marketing & LogisticsNanjing University of Finance & EconomicsNanjing,China School of Antea Economics & Management Shanghai Jiaotong University Shanghai,China
国际会议
北京
英文
2008-10-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）