A Hybrid Pricing Mechanism for Solving the Click Fraud Problem in AdWords Auctions
Click fraud is a serious threat to the keyword advertising industry.In this paper,we designed a hybrid pricing mechanism in which an advertiser can submit both her bids for a click and for an impression.When the real click-though rate does not exceed the predefined click-though rate she pays according to pay-per-click model,otherwise she pays according to pay-perimpression model.We proved that the hybrid pricing mechanism is resistant to click fraud and compared the search engines revenue in original AdWords auction mechanism and in our improved auction mechanism.
keyword advertising click-though rate (CTR) click fraud AdWords auction hybrid pricing mechanism
Honglei Yu Deli Yang Huifen Li
School of Management Dalian University of TechnologyDalian,China School of Management Dalian University of Technology Dalian,China
国际会议
北京
英文
2008-10-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）