会议专题

Robust Incentives in P2P Networks

Lack of central authority,highly dynamic ships,availability of cheap identity(pseudonyms),hidden or untraceable actions and collusive behaviors in P2P systems lead to free-riding and tragedy of common.Overcoming these problems is central to the performance and robustness of P2P systems.Many incentives have been proposed and implemented to encourage peers’cooperation.In this paper,we outline two key incentive techniques in recent years.OHe is reputation-based incentive,a peer with high reputation value can get more profit from the network.The other is based on game theory which utilizes MD.AMD and DAMD for game design.

Incentive reputation game theory AMD gamedesign

HaiMei Xu Lijian Tang ShouQing Qi YanJun Shi

国际会议

The International Conference Information Computing and Automation(2007国际信息计算与自动化会议)

成都

英文

860-863

2007-12-19(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)