Supply chain with national vs. store brand competition and strategic consumers
This paper considers a supplier-seller chain,in which the seller faces random quantity of strategic customers.Each customer chooses between the store brand of the seller and the national brand of the supplier according to his values to the two brands and the retail prices.The system is modeled as a Stackelburg game in which the supplier is the leader and the seller is the follower.The seller will charge a lower price to win a larger share of the market than in the case of channel optimization.Optimal responses of the players and coordination contracts are derived.We then extend the problem by considering multi suppliers and multi sellers,respectively.Main managerial insights are the impacts of parameters on the playersdecisions.
Supply chain national vs. store brand competition strategic customers Stackelburg game Contract
Weigang Zhou Chengxiu Gao Suzhen Li
School of Mathematics and StatisticsWuhan UniversityWuhan,Hubei,430072 P.R.of China School of Mathematics and Statistics Wuhan University Wuhan,Hubei,430072 P.R.of China
国际会议
北京
英文
2008-10-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）