The fuzzy cores for fuzzy cooperative games
In this paper, the fuzzy core of game with fuzzy coalition is proposed, which can be regarded as the generalization of crisp core. The fuzzy core is based on the assumption that the total worth of a fuzzy coalition will be allocated to the players whose participation rate is larger than zero The nonempty condition of the fuzzy core is given based on the fuzzy convexity. A special kind of fuzzy cores of game with fuzzy coalition is studied, and the explicit fuzzy core represented by the crisp core is also given.
Cooperative game Fuzzy coalition Core Shapley value
Xiaohui YU Qiang ZHANG
School of Management & Economics,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China
国际会议
2008 International Conference on Risk and Relianility Management(2008风险与可靠性管理国际会议)
北京
英文
798-802
2008-11-10(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)