Game Analysis of Venture Capitalists Participation in the Management of Venture Business
We analyze the venture capitalists participation in the management of venture business by means of game theory. It is necessary and possible for the venture capitalist to participate in the management of the venture-backed firm, which contains the strategic, financing, and operation management, etc. On the basis of the literature review, we analyze the mechanisms and the patterns of the venture capitalists post-investment activities. A longer venture capitalists participation in a firm may increase its value while also increasing costs for the venture capitalist. After deeply investigating the venture capitalists active and the enterprisers choices involved, we set up the static and dynamic models to analyze how their activities impact on each other and what the equilibrium result is. In conclusion, we study the factors that impact the equilibrium result and put forward some proposals.
Venture capital Game Analysis Participation in the Management Venture-backed Firm
Yu Gu Song Chen
Tongji University,China
国际会议
Academy of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 2008(创新与创业国际学术会议)
北京
英文
475-480
2008-03-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）