Formation Mechanism of the Inverse Choice in Mine Safety and Its Influence

摘要：

The safety market in the true life is complex and information in the market is asymmetric. And in the case of asymmetric information, safe mines may retreat from the market because of being not able to get enough compensation, and this will cause Inverse Ghoice in the market. All these phenomena will cause a negative externality because of the shrinking market and a low efficiency in the society. When facing a complex and sometimes even disorder game between the mines in the coal market, government must influence the game between enterprises through legislation, taxes or some policies or take part in the game in order to realize Pareto Optimum in the game.

关键词： mine safety inverse choice mechanism

作者: SI Qianzi GONG Shiwen

作者单位: School of Resource and Safe Engineering,China University of Mining & Technology,Beijing 100083,China School of Management,Shandong Institute of Business and Technology,Yantai 264005,Shandong,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 2008 International Symposium on Safety Science and Technology(2008年安全科学技术国际会议)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 2353-2357

在线出版日期: 2008-09-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）