A Differentiated Oligopoly Game Model of Initial Emission Permits Allocation

摘要：

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the allocation of output and the initial emission permits for two enterprises to produce differentiated product in an oligopoly game.By using a linear demand system,this paper obtains the allocation of output and the initial emission permits under the condition that the market power exists.Furthermore,it analyses the relation between the allocation results of output and the equilibrium price of emission permits.The study shows that when the equilibrium price of emission permits raises,the total equilibrium output will decrease,while the change rule of the individual output is complicated.If the cleanness parameter in the game model is same,the enterprisesequilibrium output will decline equivalently.Assuming that the cleanness parameter,in model is not same,and the other parameters in model satisfy different conditions,the market shares of output due to the change of the equilibrium price of emission permits transforms from polluting enterprise to cleaning one.It is needed to point out that with the raising of equilibrium price of emission permits,the individual output may increase on the condition that the related conditions hold.

关键词： Oligopoly game Initial emission permits allocation Output allocation Strategic interaction Differentiated product

作者: LU Haishu

作者单位: School of Economics and Management Jiangsu Teachers University of Technology Changzhou 213001,P.R.China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: Interantional Conference on Idustry Cluster Development and Management(2008产业基地建设与管理国际研讨会)

会议地点: 常州

会议语种:英文

页码: 928-933

在线出版日期: 2008-06-27（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）