A Research on the Alienation of the Reward Function of the Executive Stock Option

摘要：

As an incentive, Executive Stock Option (ESO) plays an important role to perfect the corporate governance. It allows the executives interest to be consistent with the proprietors interest.But the executive reward function added ESO factor seems to alienate from the original objective: the stock price becomes the main determinant factor, while the stock price is independ of the companysperfomance or the effort of executives.Therefore, it leads to the blind expansion and fianancial fraud,thus aggravating the bubble growth and stock prices fluctuations, and seducing cahoots of stock market participators. Then it weakens the incentive effect of ESO.

关键词： Executive Stock Opuon Reward Function Mortal Risk Residual Claim

作者: LIU Jian-jiang CHEN Haiyan

作者单位: School of Economy,Changsha University of Science and Technology,Chaugsha,Hunan 410076

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 5th International Annual Conference on WTO and Financial Engineering(第五届WTO与金融工程国际会议)

会议地点: 杭州

会议语种:英文

页码: 284-290

在线出版日期: 2008-05-18（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）