Impacts of Information Asymmetry on the Development Of Private Equity in China Mainland

摘要：

Private equity(PE)investment has seen rapid development in China in recent years．However,as PE(especially foreign PE)is not equipped with adequate information about Chinese enterprises and markets and Chinese enterprises also lacks experience in financing from PE，there is a significant Information Asymmetry．The presence of the Information Asymmetry provides a space for agencies between PE and enterprises．This study first explores the game between PE and enterprises using the Game Theory and our analysis using the Game Model shows that the Information Asymmetry may lead to wrong decisions in PE investment，though our model is not supposed to cover all possibilities；on the other hand,there are two modes of the game between PE，the agency and the enterprise and the Information Asymmetry is the core factor dictating the profiting of the agency．Lastly,this study proposes several suggestions as to the development of PE in China．

关键词： Information asymmetry Private equity Signal game

作者: LI Xiaozhou

作者单位: Finance School of Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade,Shanghai,201620

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2008 Conference on Regional Economy and Sustainable Development(2008区域经济与可持续发展国际学术会议)

会议地点: 济南

会议语种:英文

页码: 766-771

在线出版日期: 2008-11-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）