Multidimensional Auction Models in Supply Contracts

摘要：

We consider multidimensional auctions for procurement in supply chain settings.A buyer uses a reserves auction to determine which supplier will be awarded the supply contract.Demand distribution are common knowledge,however the buyer only knows the prior distribution of suppliers cost parameters such as unit production cost and salvage value.Two types of multidimensional contracts are considered in this paper.In quantity flexibility contract,each supplier will bid wholesale price and quantity flexibility;in buy-back contract,each supplier will bid wholesale price and buy-back price.The expected utility of the buyer is a function of both terms in a bid.The buyer selects the winner according to the scoring rule.We show that by revealing the buyers true utility function as the scoring rule,supply chain is always coordinated by the suppliers bids.Authors BriefWU Jiang Hua-PhD of Purdue University,lecturer in School of Business,Renmin University of China.ZHAI Xin-PhD of Purdue University,lecturer in Guanghua School of Management,Peking University.

关键词： supply chain management multidimensional auctions mechanism design

作者: WU Jiang Hua ZHAI Xin

作者单位: School of Business,Renmin University of China,P.R.China,100872 Guanghua School of Management,Peking University,P.R.China,100871

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering(2007管理科学与工程国际学术会议)

会议地点: 河南焦作

会议语种:英文

页码: 2776-2781

在线出版日期: 2007-08-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）