Design on the Dynamic Monitor Contracts of Staged Financing in Venture Capital

摘要：

Due to the asymmetry of information,there are serious adverse selection and moral hazard problems between venture capitalist (VC) and venture entrepreneur (VE) in venture capital.So as to prevent their profits from invading,VC always chooses staged financing as a basic investment strategy.However,by practice investigating,it is proved that staged financing strategy can not gain expected effect unless designing guarantee contract.Therefore,combining the complexity and dynamic characteristic of staged financing and basing on the investment profits of VC,this thesis firstly design the whole management framework of dynamic monitor mechanism in staged financing.Further more,basing on the management framework,several idiographic monitor modules are designed,and a whole dynamic monitor model is formed by applying modularize theory.In conclusion,a thought of contract guarantee is proposed to make staged financing in venture capital go on wheels.

关键词： Venture Capital Staged Financing Dynamic Monitor Contract

作者: QUAN Xiaofeng YIN Hongying

作者单位: Management School of LuDong University,Yantai,264025,China Shanghai General Motors DongYue Company,Yantai,264006,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering(2007管理科学与工程国际学术会议)

会议地点: 河南焦作

会议语种:英文

页码: 1731-1734

在线出版日期: 2007-08-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）