Research on Cost Control for Building Service Subcontract based on Principal -Agent Theory

摘要：

The essence of principal-agent theory is to solve principals incentive to agent under interest conflict and information asymmetry.This paper analyzed the principal-agent relationship in building service subcontract and major cost issues in the subcontracting process.Based on the criteria of unified area wastage quota possessed by building company in each area,this paper builds incentive system for subcontract service team(agent) through materials,machines and equipments,thus eliminating negativity caused by information asymmetry for building company(principal),effectively reducing commission cost and maximizing principals expected profit.

关键词： Principal-agent theory Construction company Labor service subcontract Incentive and obligation system

作者: LIU Ruiyu YU Rui

作者单位: Economics and Management School,Wuhan University,P.R.China,430072

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering(2007管理科学与工程国际学术会议)

会议地点: 河南焦作

会议语种:英文

页码: 1471-1474

在线出版日期: 2007-08-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）