Review the Reputation Incentive System of Entrepreneurs in State-owned Enterprises

摘要：

This article adopts reputation theory to restrain the opportunism behavior of state-owned enterprises entrepreneur from the nonmaterial angle and also establishes the model that reputation factors is being taken into account between the reputation incentive of the state-owned enterprise entrepreneurs and behavior choice.Considering of reputation effect,this article establishes a reputation game model of dynamic.Based on the model,a conclusion has been drawn: the degree of hard working during the period affected by reputation is strictly bigger than that during the period not affected by reputation,and examines the applicability of the model through one case.

关键词： reputation incentive dynamic incentive reputation model

作者: YANG Shuili ZHENG Jianzhi

作者单位: School of Management,Xian University of Technology,P.R.China,710048

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering(2007管理科学与工程国际学术会议)

会议地点: 河南焦作

会议语种:英文

页码: 1431-1436

在线出版日期: 2007-08-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）