The Analytics of Per-Unit Bids in Auction Sales and the Potential Misallocation of Natural Resources
We develop in this paper a simple model of an auction institution in which bids are accepted in per-unit form and payments depend on the buyers post-sale harvesting behavior.The auction model illustrates the analytics of the moral hazard problem faced by sellers who choose per-unit bidding rules.Moral hazard has implications for seller revenue and may cause inefficient resource allocation due to resources being destroyed or left unextracted even though their market value exceeds the cost of extraction,per-unit bid.
F.W.Rusco W.D.Walls
Assistant Director,Centre for Economics,U.S.GAO,Washington,D.C.,U.S.A. Visiting Scholar,Department of Economics,School of Business & Management,Hong Kong University of Sci
国际会议
2007 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering(2007管理科学与工程国际学术会议)
河南焦作
英文
1045-1050
2007-08-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）