Strategic Delegation and Licensing of Patented Technology under Fixed Fee Schedule

摘要：

In most existing literature on patent licensing under market competition,firms are (implicitly) assumed to be the owner-manager type.In reality,however,firm owners may deliberately delegate the operation decisions of the firm to its manager for strategic reasons.This paper investigates,in a duopoly market,the impact of strategic delegation by the (owners of the) firms on the licensing of patented technology under fixed license fee schedule.Our results show that,for larger value-added technological innovation,strategic delegation may under certain conditions hinder the diffusion of patented technology.Finally,the policy implications of the conclusions (especially with respect for China) are given.

关键词： License Patent Strategic delegation Technology diffusion

作者: GUO Xinshuai MIAO Baiqi

作者单位: School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,P.R.China,230026

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering(2007管理科学与工程国际学术会议)

会议地点: 河南焦作

会议语种:英文

页码: 1024-1029

在线出版日期: 2007-08-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）