Optimal Incentive Contract on Human Capital Investment under Imperfect Information

摘要：

In this paper,a model of employer-employee contractions that include the possibility of human capital investment and an endogenous labor market in a multi period environment has been built.The structure of the optimal decision and the effects of various parameters on the optimal decisions were derived.The results of this paper show that the optimal incentive contracts will have different requirements and a payoff,depending on the agents initial skill level,and the labor market is the driving force in the agents human capital investment decision.

关键词： Human capital investment Incentive Optimal contract Imperfect information

作者: TIAN ying PAN xiaolin

作者单位: College of Mathematics and Computer science,Chongqing Normal Univercity,Chongqing 400047,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering(2007管理科学与工程国际学术会议)

会议地点: 河南焦作

会议语种:英文

页码: 685-690

在线出版日期: 2007-08-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）