Misrepresentation-proof Strategies in Enterprise Group

摘要：

Optimal strategies are proposed to prevent false representation in enterprise group.It is supposed that the manager of enterprise group can know the truth by inspection but can not inspect all reports of members due to the high cost of inspection,and the manager will announce penalty rules and the corresponding probability of doing inspection for preventing false representation.After formulating two penalty rules,the minimal inspection probability required for inducing true information under each penalty rule is given.

关键词： Enterprise group False representation Incentive Penalty rule

作者: CHEN Yiming

作者单位: Management School,Changsha University of Science and Teclmology,P.R.China,410076

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering(2007管理科学与工程国际学术会议)

会议地点: 河南焦作

会议语种:英文

页码: 30-34

在线出版日期: 2007-08-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）