An Incentive Compatible Dynamic Wage Contract in Enterprises: Modeling and Simulation

摘要：

There is moral hazard caused by workers shiftless actions because of asymmetry information between the enterprise and workers in the management of an enterprise. It is necessary to make a long-term wage contract to workers actions. Based on principle-agent theory and human resources management practices, an incentive compatible dynamic wage contract model is formalized and simulated. According to the consequences of simulating, the optimal contract is characterized analytically. The optimal dynamic wage contract not only can offer incentives to workers and make them work hard, but also can smooth the enterprises incentive costs and help the enterprise realize the Pareto optimal resource allocation. It proves the contract model is valid and provides some reasonable conclusions for enterprises.

关键词： incentive compatible moral hazard dynamic wage contract principal-agent simulation.

作者: Wenxia You Xianjia Wang Wentao Fan

作者单位: College of Electrical Engineering & Information Technology China Three Gorges University Yichang 443 System Engineering Institute Wuhan University Wuhan 430072, China Wuhan Institute of Physics & Mathematics the Chinese Academy of Sciences Wuhan 430071,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 Conference on Systems Science, Management Science and System Dynamics(第二届系统科学、管理科学与系统动力学国际会议)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 2703-2708

在线出版日期: 2007-10-19（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）