Anchoring Effects, Switching Costs, and Market Competition

摘要：

Based on the model of Klemperer (1987) with switching costs, we introduce consumers anchoring effects into a two-period pricing game. In a symmetric equilibrium, when the degree of anchoring effects is low enough,the switching costs will work in terms of the second-period price competition. Each firm pays more attention to pursue market share by pricing lower in the first period but exploit the surpluses of attached consumers by charging a higher price in the second period. However, when the degree of anchoring effects is high enough, the switching costs wont work, so each firm will take an adverse pricing strategy. Especially,when there are perfect anchoring effects among consumers, we will achieve a Supermonopoly -Bertrand Equilibrium.

关键词： Anchoring effects Switching costs Horizontal differentiation Price competition

作者: Yang Jianxia Li Ruihai

作者单位: School of Economics Shanghai Jiao Tong University Shanghai, China Department of Tong Ji University Shanghai, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 Conference on Systems Science, Management Science and System Dynamics(第二届系统科学、管理科学与系统动力学国际会议)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 2613-2620

在线出版日期: 2007-10-19（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）