Economic Studies of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance Market

摘要：

In insurance market, the two problems of adverse selection and moral hazard such as insurance fraud have damaged badly the normal operation and healthy development of insurance industry. The interrelation of insurance fraud and adverse selection was analyzed in the paper by applying the correlative knowledge of game theory and information economics. And it is indicated that insurance fraud will lead to the increase of insurance premium and further bring the adverse selection under the information asymmetry. At a result, the point of the problem lies in how to curtail the occurrence and development of insurance fraud. Finally the corresponding measures were advanced for preventing and punishing the insurance fraud.

关键词： Adverse selection insurance fraud (moral hazard) insurance market.

作者: Liqing Xing Shaorong Sun

作者单位: School of management,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 Conference on Systems Science, Management Science and System Dynamics(第二届系统科学、管理科学与系统动力学国际会议)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 2443-2452

在线出版日期: 2007-10-19（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）