The Rule of One-way Traffic Game Based on Incomplete Contract Theory

摘要：

Supposing that agents are uncertainty averse,the incomplete contract theory that Ma(2000, 2003) proposed, considers that agents may agree on incomplete contracts even though signing a complete contract is costless. This paper applies this theory to study the rule of one-way traffic game with characteristics of one-way and inconsistent actions, such as one-way street and escalators.And the detailed example of one-way walking on escalator is given and two game cases with 3 players are analyzed by backward induction. The solutions of the complete contracts and incomplete contracts are solved under incomplete contract theory. Finally, the paper verifies the rationality of one-way traffic organization management and indicates that incomplete contracts make contract contents simple and clear, and reach the same social effects as complete ones do.

关键词： uncertainty aversion incomplete contract stability and core criteria equilibrium contract one-way traffic.

作者: Lihui Sun Ruirui Zhang Jiasheng Ding

作者单位: Management Science and Engineering Department Qingdao University Qingdao, Shandong Province,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 Conference on Systems Science, Management Science and System Dynamics(第二届系统科学、管理科学与系统动力学国际会议)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 1875-1880

在线出版日期: 2007-10-19（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）