Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis on Industrial Pollution Problem of China

摘要：

Exploring the reasons of industrial pollution with evolutionary game theory, and analyzing the enterprises and the environmental protection departments long-term behavioral trends on environmental pollution and treatment. The results show that if the cost for treating pollution of industrial enterprises is larger than the loss caused by environmental pollution or the punishment, then enterprises discharge pollutants directly. Reforming the financial and administrative system of environmental protection departments, and encouraging public take part in environmental treatment, enhancing the technical level of industrial pollution treatment and reducing the cost, increasing the punishment on enterprises for discharging pollution directly, then industrial pollution problem can be solved.

关键词： Industrial pollution supervision evolutionary game theory evolutionary stable strategy.

作者: Fangyuan Lu Kui Li

作者单位: Economic Professor Business School Zhengzhou University Zhengzhou, P. R. China Business School Zhengzhou University Zhengzhou, P. R. China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 Conference on Systems Science, Management Science and System Dynamics(第二届系统科学、管理科学与系统动力学国际会议)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 1501-1512

在线出版日期: 2007-10-19（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）