The Supply Chain Incentive Contract under Double Moral-Hazard

摘要：

In this paper, by the principal-agent theory, we study the game between the supplier and retailer under asymmetric information.We design the supply chain incentive contract in the double moral-hazard situation in which the supplier (as the principal) also affects the sales.In fact, the model is constructed as a Stackelberg game which solution is the optimal policy of the supplier. As a benchmark, we first get the solution of the case of the complete information. Then we compare the policy with the case of the asymmetric information and study the characteristics of the optimal contract.

关键词： Supply Chain double moral hazard Principal-agent theory Stackelberg game asymmetric information.

作者: Shanliang Li Chunhua Wang

作者单位: School of Management Fudan University, Shanghai, China, 200433 Politics and Public Administration Sc School of Information Shanghai Fisheries University Shanghai, China, 200090

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 Conference on Systems Science, Management Science and System Dynamics(第二届系统科学、管理科学与系统动力学国际会议)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 1177-1182

在线出版日期: 2007-10-19（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）