Research on Punctuality Incentive Model in Airline Company Based on Stackelberg Game

摘要：

In this paper the punctuality incentive measure is studied for the enormous impact of flight delay on the benefit of airline companies. The principles of the scientifical punctuality rate evaluating mechanism of the company are discussed. Because of the act of the branches to the evaluating standard put forward by the company in order for the maximum benefit of themselves, the mathematical programming model based on Stackelberg game is given to study the optimal decision for both the company and the branches simultaneously. Next the algorithm of the model is discussed. The numerical example shows the difference decisions between the branches in different status and the future research is discussed at last.

关键词： Punctuality rate Stackelberg game incentive mathematical programming.

作者: Chuanliang Jia

作者单位: School of Management Science and Engineering Central University of Finance and Economics Beijing, P.R.China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007 Conference on Systems Science, Management Science and System Dynamics(第二届系统科学、管理科学与系统动力学国际会议)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 845-852

在线出版日期: 2007-10-19（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）