Revenue Sharing Contract in Supply Chain with Bayesian and Censored Newsvendor
This paper considers a finite-horizon supply chain of perishable goods with one supplier and one retailer. Retailer is censored newsvendor facing general parametric demand distributions, which are price-dependent and involves unknown parameter(s). Using a Bayesian Markov decision process formulation,we show that revenue sharing contracts can achieve channel coordination in the above system. This paper provides the set of contract parameters that coordinate the retailers action and point out that the parameters are independent on the retailers price policy and its action taken at each period. So it is convenient to use revenue sharing contracts to improve the performance of such supply chain.Based on numerical study, we compare the coordinated supply chain with that under the wholesale price contracts and show the former has better performance.
Supply chain Bayesian Markov decision processes Unknown demand Censored demand Revenue sharing contract.
Daoping Wang Hongxia Su
School of Economic & Management University of Science and Technology Beijing,P.R.China
国际会议
2007 Conference on Systems Science, Management Science and System Dynamics(第二届系统科学、管理科学与系统动力学国际会议)
上海
英文
1855-1860
2007-10-19(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)