Effect of Managerial Discretion on CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity

摘要：

Both Chinese and foreign scholars have discussed many factors that affect CEO pay-performance sensitivity.However,the persistently low CEO payperformance sensitivity is still not explained effectively.From the perspective of internal governance structure,managerial discretion is introduced as a variable comprehensively reflecting corporate governance quality into traditional Hermalin model and a new theoretical model focusing on the effect of managerial discretion on CEO pay-performance sensitivity is constructed.Based on the model,the paper finds that managerial discretion can affect CEO pay-performance sensitivity negatively to a great deal.

关键词： CEO Pay-performance sensitivity Managerial discretion Corporate governance Listed firms

作者: Changzheng ZHANG Jie XIE Genlin ZHANG

作者单位: School of Business Administration,Xian University of Technology,Xian 710054 Foreign Studies Department,Xian University of Architecture & Technology,Xian 710055;School of Mana School of Management,Xian Jiaotong University,Xian 710049

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 2008 International Conference on Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering(BIFE 2008)(商业智能和金融工程国际会议)

会议地点: 长沙

会议语种:英文

页码: 700-706

在线出版日期: 2008-10-28（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）