Peer Pressure and Team Incentive Incorporating Inequity Aversion

摘要：

This paper investigates peer pressure and team incentive by incorporating inequity aversion,which has been ignored by the standard game theory,but has also been proven by a series of game experiments.It is found that the internal peer pressure stems from very strong inequity aversion,while the external peer pressure derives from peer sanction and comparatively weak inequity aversion,both of which can implement optimal team incentive.The stronger the inequity aversion,the more possible it is to implement optimal team incentive.Therefore,the employer can facilitate teamwork by cultivating and strengthening the inequity aversion of employees.

关键词： peer pressure team incentive inequity aversion game theory

作者: Guangxing Wei Yanhong Qin

作者单位: School of Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,P.R.China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 2008 International Conference on Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering(BIFE 2008)(商业智能和金融工程国际会议)

会议地点: 长沙

会议语种:英文

页码: 625-632

在线出版日期: 2008-10-28（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）