Pricing Decisions and Coordination in a Two-echelon Supply Chain with Two Competing Retailers

摘要：

This paper studies pricing decision and coordination in a two-echelon supply chain which consists of one manufacturer and two nonidentical retailers who use retail price to compete for the end customers with complete information.The manufacturer takes Stackelberg leadership in dictating the wholesale pricing terms by implementing a two-part tariff.The sub game perfect Nash equilibrium has been get by use backward induction method.The retailer with larger market base or lower retail price has comparative advantage in the market.And the effect of the two-part tariff is equal to the quantity discount,which means the wholesale price is concerned with the order quantity (market demand).The structure of wholesale pricing mechanisms that are linear in the order quantity can coordinate the system under limiting condition.

关键词： two-echelon supply chain pricing decision coordination game theory

作者: XU Beibei ZHANG Hanjiang

作者单位: School of Economics and Trade,Hunan University,P.R.China,410079

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2008 International Conference on Lofistics Engineering and Supply Chain(2008物流与供应链管理国际研讨会)

会议地点: 长沙

会议语种:英文

页码: 392-397

在线出版日期: 2008-08-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）