Modeling for Rebate and Penalty Contract with Retailers Combined Decision Bias

摘要：

This paper considers a supply chain model in which a single supplier sells a single product to a single retailer who faces the newsvendor problem.We establish the supply chain with retailers combined decision bias,and analyze how the retailers bias affects his order quantity and the contract parameter.The results show that the supply chain can achieve channel coordination with rebate and penalty contract,the rebate and penalty quotiety increases as the retailers waste-averse preferences increases and decreases as stockout-averse preferences increases.With the numerical examples,we demonstrate that the retailers expected profit and utility of rebate and penalty are more than that of the decentralized decision making system.

关键词： Supply Chain Management Rebate and Penalty Contract Coordination Combined Decision Bias

作者: ZHU Jinlou SONG Fugen

作者单位: Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai,P.R.China,200051

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2008 International Conference on Lofistics Engineering and Supply Chain(2008物流与供应链管理国际研讨会)

会议地点: 长沙

会议语种:英文

页码: 75-82

在线出版日期: 2008-08-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）