Satisfaction Degree of Consumers and Incentive Mechanism
In this paper, an incentive contract under principal-agent framework is designed. Employees are motivated by not only the commission based on the output, but also the bonus or penalty based on consumer satisfaction degree, which is randomly inspected by management. The effort is decomposed effort into technical effort and service effort, both of which affect the current and future outputs, as well as the consumers satisfaction. Consumers measure their satisfaction degrees with the deviation between their expectations and real consuming experience. Results indicate that the firm receives higher profit by regarding the consumer satisfaction degree as a measure of motivation, which confirms the previous statement that the consumer satisfaction degree is an important factor affecting the firms profit. It is further explored the intuitive optimal inspection probability and the requirement to achieve consumer satisfaction under optimal contract.
Principal-Agent Consumer Satisfaction Incentive Contract Commission Rate
Cai Xiulian Xiao Tiaojun
School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing, P. R. China, 210093
国际会议
郑州
英文
2008-09-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）