Optimum Design of Incentive Contract for Promoting Enterprises to Develop Circulation Economy
The paper studies the incentive mechanism by government of promoting enterprise to develop circulation economy with different risk attitudes. The article builds up a game model under the risk-averse and risk-neutral conditions, and discusses the factors which influence enterprise risk and government allowance. Besides, another contract variable with reputation incentive is also introduced into incentive contract. The results indicate that enterprises risk-averse degree, enterprises capacity coefficient and enterprises cost affect the implementation of circulation economy. Government should put forward preferable policies to promote enterprise undertaking the circulation economy risk voluntarily, such as price, tax, credit, and insurance policies. In the end, both substance incentive and reputation incentive are proved necessary, and the contract with reputation incentive is more applicable.
Circulation Economy Incentive Mechanism Risk Attitude Institutional Arrangements
Liu Wei Zhou Junying Cheng Guoping
College of Economics and Management, Henan Agricultural University,Zhengzhou, P.R. China, 450002 School of Management, Henan University of Technology, Zhengzhou, P.R. China, 450052 School of Management, Henan University of Technology, Zhengzhou, P.R. China, 450052;Zhengzhou Price
国际会议
郑州
英文
2008-09-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）