Incentive Mechanism Design of Dual-Principal-agent under Sales Activities

摘要：

We study on agents and enterprises sales activities under complete information.. Firstly, if the enterprise has no sales agents, leader-follows game between enterprise and its sales department are established under introducing punish mechanism or not. Then, if the enterprise has its sales agents, second-degree leader-follows model of the management, sales department and sales agents are analyzed. The theory direction for incentive mechanism of enterprises sale management under different conditions is provided

关键词： Sale Management Leader-follows Game Agent Incentive-mechanism Principal-agent

作者: Yao Zeyou Cao Xiyu

作者单位: Zhongshan college, University of Electronic Science and Technology, Zhongshan, P.R.China,528402

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 15th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management(IE&EM2008)(第十五届工业工程与工程管理国际学术会议暨中国机械工程学会第11次工业工程年会)

会议地点: 郑州

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2008-09-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）