Research on the Administrative Cost Control Model Based on the Principal-Agent Theory

摘要：

In this paper, we analyze the asymmetry information of government administrative cost control. We model the problem as a Principal-Agent model. Then we discuss the issue of how the upper-level government encourages the lower-level government to reduce the administrative cost initiatively under the moral hazard situation. In view of incentive mechanism we design a contract. We use the genetic algorithm to do the simulation and work out the optimal contract coefficients.

关键词： Principal-Agent Theory Asymmetric Information Administrative Cost Genetic Algorithm

作者: Li Li Chu Xianghua Ma Lijun

作者单位: School of Management, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, P.R.China, 518060

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 15th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management(IE&EM2008)(第十五届工业工程与工程管理国际学术会议暨中国机械工程学会第11次工业工程年会)

会议地点: 郑州

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2008-09-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）