Analysis on the Strategical Competition between Chinese State-owned Commercial Bank and Foreign Bank under the condition of opening in the Bank Industry based on the two types of Mixed Oligopoly Models
Under the condition of opening in Chinese bank industry,this paper firstly analyze the bank competition,including their equilibrium profits,between the state-owned commercial bank and foreign banks with the application of a Cournot mixed oligopoly model. We find that under some conditions,the equilibrium deposits of the state-owned commercial bank and the foreign bank will decrease with the increasing of the number of foreign banks,and when more and more foreign banks enter the Chinese bank industry or with the rising of the profit target of the state-owned bank,the equilibrium profit of foreign bank will increase. Besides,the authors analyze the problem of the ex ante information disclosure in the strategical competition between state-owned commercial bank and foreign bank based on the Stackelberg mixed oligopoly model. We find that the premature disclosure of the willing quantity of drawing deposit by state-owned commercial bank leads it to the first moving disadvantage,comparing with the simultaneous declaration for the willing quantities of state-owned and foreign banks; the state-owned commercial bank would face the living crisis if foreign bank put the deposit from Chinese saving market into the global market to earn the higher payment in the way of associating bargaining; the premature disclosure for the operating plan of state-owned bank and the absent disclosure for the operating area of foreign bank all give rise to the impact on the competition ability of stat-owned bank to the foreign bank.
mixed oligopoly state-owned bank foreign bank bank competition
侯晓辉 周翔翼 姬升良
西安交通大学金禾经济研究中心西安710049 西安工业大学管理学院西安710032
国际会议
成都
英文
2007-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）