Financing Decisions in Newly Privatized Chinese Firms:Does A Stock Market Quotation Really Provide Disciplining?
This paper uses the pecking order framework of Helwege and Liang (1996) to investigate the postlisting financing decisions of 258 partially privatised Chinese firms during 1994-1999. First,we estimate a logit model to explain the decision to raise external financing,be it bank loans or seasoned equity. Our results show that the probability of obtaining external funds is positively related to the firms cash deficit,but firms with low profitability may have difficulty to collect funding. Second,we examine the type of security being issued and find that unlike listed firms in developed countries,default risk is negatively related to the probability of raising equity whereas asymmetric information is only of limited impact. Overall,we document some important differences between firms where the government holds versus relinquishes its majority ownership after privatization and link these to differences in governance.
privatization capital structure asymmetric information default risk governance
Nancy Huyghebaert Qi Quan Lijian Sun
Associate Professor of Finance,Katholieke Universiteit Leuven,Department of Accountancy,Finance and Insurance,Naamsestraat 69,3000 Leuven,Belgium
国际会议
成都
英文
2007-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）