ARRANGER CERTIFICATION IN PROJECT FINANCE
Though highly plausible,empirical research has found little unambiguous evidence of third-party certification in capital market financings,due to confounding influences and multiple impacts. We examine certification by lead arrangers of project finance (PF) loans,because PF vehicle companies are stand-alone entities,created for a single purpose,so all valuation impacts will be contained in the project financing package. Using a sample of 4,122 project finance loans,worth $584 billion,arranged between 1991 and 2005,we show that certification creates economic value by reducing overall loan spreads. We find that more prestigious arranging banks (top-tier arrangers) are sometimes compensated with higher fees. To some degree this rejects the direct compensation hypothesis and supports the indirect compensation hypothesis-as does our finding that top-tier arrangers allow riskier and larger loans to be funded than could less prestigious arrangers. We also present the first comprehensive,large sample analysis of PF financial packages.
international corporate governance bank lending project finance syndication
Stefano Gatti Stefanie Kleimeier William L.Megginson Alessandro Steffanoni
Bocconi University Maastricht University The University of Oklahoma Interbanca - Structured and Project finance Dept
国际会议
成都
英文
2007-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）