CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? THE EVIDENCE BEHIND PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE

摘要：

Recourse to independent directors by private equity investors is not tied to performance increases. We draw this conclusion from analyzing a unique data set representative of the European context: all deals made by Italian closed-end funds from 1999 to 2003. Our study shows,in fact,that corporate governance does not impact the rate of return on a deal. Performance,instead,is driven by the characteristics of an initiative (exit-way,holding period and shareholding). Further,we find that independent directors are involved in deals requiring greater skills and knowhow. They tend to resign when performance is unsatisfactory. Moreover,these professionals improve deal performance if their commitment with the management company lasts throughout the deal and if there is a continual turnover of these directors.

关键词： performance puzzle independent director corporate governance closed-end fund private equity

作者: Stefano Caselli Francesco Corielli Stefano Gatti

作者单位: Institute of Financial Markets and Financial Intermediation,Bocconi University Institute of Quantitative Methods Bocconi University Associate Professor Institute of Financial Markets and Financial Intermediation

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007年中国国际金融年会

会议地点: 成都

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2007-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）