Banks Ex Ante Screening,Social Bankruptcy Cost and Bank Loan Financing System

摘要：

In the economy where a large numbers of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Private-Owned Enterprises (POEs) compete for project financing where there is social cost of bankruptcy,SOEs and POEs will act differently when it comes to bankruptcy and repayment of bank loans. This in turn will affect the terms of bank lending and the incentives banks screen these two types of firms. We also provide the general calculation and numerical solution analysis (calibration process). Furthermore,if introduce the social capital placed cost,we find that ex ante screening would produce the reverse impact so the social surplus tradeoff is necessary. However,the government’s policy of lending interest floor rate is inefficient in the ex ante screening model,then we discuss another coordination strategy to set up indirect mortgage or guarantee mechanism. The established micro theoretical model for bank loan financing can be useful to the understanding and evaluation to the structure of China financial system and the efficiency of capital allocation.

关键词： Bank Monitoring Social Bankruptcy Cost Bank Loan Financing System Ex-Ante Screening Lending Interest Rate

作者: 倪铮 张春

作者单位: 清华大学经济管理学院伟伦楼 北112 室,邮编：100084 中欧国际工商学院

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2007年中国国际金融年会

会议地点: 成都

会议语种:英文

在线出版日期: 2007-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）